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I. INTRODUCTION
It is the position of this article that fiction-based art should be
afforded less protection than fact-based art in the context of individual right
of publicity cases.' This article examines the current First Amendment
newsworthiness analysis used for right of publicity cases in California and
evaluates why such a newsworthiness analysis is not sufficient for right of
publicity cases where an individual's persona is appropriated to aid sales
of fiction-based art.
Part I of this article suggests a five-factor analysis to be applied by
the courts when confronted with deciding which is deserving of more
protection: an individual's right of publicity or the creation of fiction-based
art. Part II of this article provides a brief discussion of the right of
publicity. Part III discusses the First Amendment newsworthiness defense
as applied by the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and California courts in right of publicity cases. Part IV explores
why fiction-based works of art should not be given as much protection as
fact-based works of art when balanced against an individual's right of
publicity. Part IV also provides a multi-factored analysis to be used when
balancing an individual's right of publicity against protecting the creation
of fiction-based art. Part V applies the author's multi-factored analysis to
two right of publicity cases involving fiction-based art, yielding two
different outcomes.
1. Fiction-based art is deserving of some constitutional protection. See Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983) ("AD fiction is false in the literal sense that it is
imagined rather than actual. However, works of fiction are constitutionally protected....");
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) ("There is no doubt that
entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.").
1995] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND ITS POLICY BASES
The right of publicity is a species of the law of privacy. California
adopted Dean Prosser's invasion of privacy analysis in 1969.2 Prosser's
analysis of the law of privacy is comprised of four different invasions upon
the plaintiff:3 (1) "[ilntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs;"4 (2) "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff;",5 (3) "[plublicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye;"' and (4) "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness."7
The fourth invasion is the only one which recognizes and protects the
commercial value of the plaintiff. This right of an individual to control the
commercial opportunities endowed with his or her persona is commonly
referred to as a "right of publicity."'  The right of publicity may be
2. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
3. Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (Prosser states that these four
different interests are "tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase





8. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977)
(holding that a right of publicity gives an individual "personal control over commercial display
and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents"); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v.
Night and Day Co., Inc., 689 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that every person has a "right
to exploit the commercial value of his name, likeness or attributes .... ); Haelan Lab., Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.) (holding that if there were no right of
publicity, "many prominent persons ... would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money" for use of their persona), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (describing a right of publicity as "the publicity
value of one's name or likeness"); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,490 (Cal.
1990) ("Every person has a proprietary interest in his own likeness and that unauthorized,
business use of likeness is redressible as a tort."), cert. denied. 499 U.S. 936 (1991); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) (finding that the right of publicity "means in
essence that the reaction of the public to name and likeness... endows the name and likeness
of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities"). See aLvo, Peter L. Felcher
& Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE
LJ. 1577, 1589 (1979) ('The right of publicity has been defined with surprising consistency by
courts and commentators; it is generally conceived as comprising a person's right in the use of
the name, likeness, activities, or personal characteristics.").
The use of the word "persona" for the purpose of this article is not to be defined narrowly
to include only "name or likeness." The right of publicity has broadened its scope from
protecting the original "name or likeness" to include protection of other identities such as an
individual's image, an individual's voice, the use of a popular phrase, and the use of an object
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narrowly defined as the right of a celebrity to control and profit from the
commercial value of his or her persona.9 However, both California and
Ninth Circuit case law disagree with the proposition that a right of publicity
cause of action is only available to celebrities; it also exists for non-
celebrities.'"
commonly associated with a celebrity. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that Waits' voice was sufficiently distinctive and widely known to give him
a protectable right in its use), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (The court held that the use of a female-shaped robot
wearing a blond wig, a long gown, and jewelry while standing in front of a game board
containing block letters was sufficient to find Vanna White's common law right of publicity
actionable. Citing Prosser, the court stated, "[i]t is not impossible that there might be
appropriation of the plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation, without the use of either his name
or likeness."), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463
(9th Cir. 1988) (stating that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not
theirs and have committed a tort in California!'); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" was
sufficient to identify Johnny Carson: "If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there
has been an invasion of his right whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used. Carson's identity
may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used."); Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1974) (The court held that the
unauthorized use of a picture of a well known race car which is associated with a well know race
car driver violated his right of publicity. The markings on the car "were not only peculiar to the
plaintiff's cars but they caused some persons to think the car in question was plaintiff's and to
infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff."). See also, J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4.9, at 4-49 (1993) (The term "persona" is used to
encompass all aspects of a person's identity, which may include any combination of photograph,
picture, voice, body movement, etc.).
9. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[The] right of
publicity is usually asserted only if the plaintiff has 'achieved in some degree a celebrated
status."' (citations omitted)); Howard I. Berkman, Note, The Right of Publicity: Protection for
Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REv. 527, 533 (1976) (arguing that a non-celebrity
should only be able to recover for injury to hurt feelings and not for the unauthorized use of his
name or picture).
10. Both California and Ninth Circuit case law "assumes without discussion that the right
[of publicity] exists" for a non-celebrity. Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790,
791-92 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1988);
Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)). See, e.g.,
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.ll (9th Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is
quite possible that the.. . appropriation of the identity of a relatively unknown person may result
in economic injury or may itself create economic-value in what was previously economically
valueless."). Over forty years ago, Melville Nimmer wrote the following in support of non-
celebrities having a right of publicity cause of action:
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have achieved the
status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather be held that every person
has the property right of publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim
for infringement of the right will turn upon the value of the publicity appropriated
which in turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by the
plaintiff. Thus, the right of publicity accorded to each individual "may have much
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity was first recognized only forty years ago by the
Second Circuit in the case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc." Today, both California12 and the Ninth Circuit13 recognize
common law 4 and statutory' 5 rights of publicity.
or little, or only a nominal value," but the right should be available to everyone.
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 217 (1954).
For an in-depth discussion on who is a celebrity and how the term "celebrity" encompasses
more than the typical category of "movie idols, rock stars and ball players," see H. Lee
Hetherington, Direct Commercial E&ploitation of ldentity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity,
17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1992); MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.1, at 4-3 to 4-5.
11. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). In Haelan, the issue revolved
around the right of Topps to display a baseball player's image on their baseball cards. Id at 867.
The Second Circuit distinguished between two different rights: the "right of privacy" and the
"right of publicity." Id at 868. The right of privacy protected the ballplayer from hurt feelings,
while the right of publicity protected his economic interest in the commercial use of his image.
Id.
12. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal
1993); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing a
common law right of publicity, although the court found that Dora's case did not involve the
"right of publicity" type of appropriation); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct.
App. 1983).
Today, there are a total of 24 states that recognize either a common law or a statutory right
of publicity. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 6.1[B], at 6-6. Out of the 24 states that recognize a
right of publicity, 15 of them recognize the right as a common law right and the remaining nine
recognize the right by state statute. Id California recognizes both a common law and a statutory
right of publicity. Id
13. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Cher v. Forum Int'l,
Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); Motschenbacher v. RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
14. In California, the common law cause of action for right of publicity "may be plead by
alleging (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name
or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury." Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983).
Appropriation has been described as being of two types. Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 791-92 (Ct. App. 1993). The first type is that of a right of publicity which
involves "commercially exploitable opportunities." Id. The second type is that which "brings
injury to the feelings, that concerns one's own peace of mind, and that is mental and subjective."
ld.
15. The statutory remedy available for infringements of rights of publicity is provided for
by California Civil Code §§ 3344 and 990. Unlike the California common law right of publicity,
§ 3344(a) requires that the additional element of intent be satisfied in order for an individual's
right of publicity claim to be actionable. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West 1993) ("Any person
who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness .. ') (emphasis
added); see also, Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983) ('In
addition, to plead the statutory remedy provided in Civil Code § 3344, there must also be an
allegation of a knowing use of the plaintiff's name, photograph or likeness.").
19951
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The United States Supreme Court has been confronted with a right of
publicity case only once, in 1977.16 The Supreme Court, in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,' 7 upheld, in a five to four decision, the
plaintiff's claim under Ohio common law in the face of a First Amendment
defense. 8 Three main policy reasons for the protection of Zacchini's
right of publicity were advanced by the majority:'9 (1) protecting the
economic value of an individual's identity;20 (2) preventing unjust
enrichment to the infringer of an individual's identity;2 and (3) providing
incentives to performers to produce entertaining or intellectual works.2
Thus, in balancing the First Amendment newsworthiness defense against
the plaintiff's right to produce entertaining works, the First Amendment
defense was outweighed.Y Although the holding in the Zacchini case is
well reasoned, it is unclear whether the holding provides any guidance to
right of publicity cases where the defendant uses less than the performer's
entire act.
Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has stated that "[a] 'direct' connection must
be alleged between the use and the commercial purpose." Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 381 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the defendant's use of a magazine
article about plaintiff in defendant's textbook was not "so 'directly' connected with the sale" to
have any substantial impact on the sale of the textbook, and thus does not fall within the ambit
of § 3344).
Section 990 of the California Civil Code provides for the descendibility of a right of
publicity claim. However, there is no common-law right of publicity concerning an individual
who is already deceased. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1979) (citing
DEAN PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 814-15 (4th ed. 1971); see discussion infra, note 165).
16. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, Hugo
Zacchini's 15 second act as the "human cannonball" was videotaped by a television news reporter
while at the county fair and was then subsequently shown on the evening news. Id
17. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
18. /L at 578-79.
19. Id at 575-77.
20. Id. at 575-76. See discussion infra, part II.A.
21. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. See discussion infra, part ILB.
22. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77. See discussion infra, part II.C.
23. Zacchini, at 578-79.
24. Justice White, while stressing the strong policy reasons in favor of free access to
newsworthy events, found that the First Amendment privilege asserted by the defendant did not
immunize the broadcast company when it broadcast Zacchini's entire act without his consent.
Id. at 569-77 (emphasis added). The majority stated that "[w]herever the line in particular
situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are
quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent." Id at 574-75.
In the dissent, Justice Powell questions whether Zacchini falls within the Court's holding
because it is unlikely that Zacchini's entire act took only 15 seconds. Id at 579 n.1 (Powell, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). There was probably some fanfare before and after
the actual performance. Il
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There is another policy reason suggested by some commentators:
recognizing a right of publicity helps promote truthful advertising and
endorsements so as not to mislead consumers by falsely associating a
celebrity with the use of a product or service.' Although promoting
truthful advertising and endorsements is an important and sound rationale
for recognizing the right of publicity claim, these concerns are not the focus
of this article.26
The three main policy reasons advanced by the majority in Zacchini
are briefly discussed in Parts 1l.A, ll.B, and II.C below in light of their
applicability and usefulness to the right of publicity.
A. Avoiding Dilution of the Economic
Value of an Individual's Identity
For most, becoming a person of prominence and notoriety requires
expenditure of an enormous amount of time, energy, and money." These
individuals are constantly trying to "sell" themselves and their images to
those with whom they wish to be associated. If we refuse to recognize an
individual's property rights in his or her own persona, the public will, in
essence, own that individual's persona.' If this "taking" by the public of
an individual's persona occurs, then there is little, if any, economic value
of that individual's identity.29
25. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histories,
51 TX. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 990 (1964).
26. For further discussion of this rationale, see MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 2.4, at 2-14 to
2-16.
27. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Often
considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop the ability in a person's name or
likeness to attract attention and evoke a desired response in a particular consumer market.").
28. See Raymond H. Goettsch, Comment, The Right of Publicity: Premature Burial for
California Property Rights in the Wake of Lugosi, 12 PAc. L.J. 987, 995-96 (1981).
29. Chief Justice Bird, in her dissent in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal.
1979), cited to the rationale provided in James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names,
Likenesses, and Personal Exploitation, 51 Tlx L. REV. 637 (1973), to bolster her anti-dilution
argument in favor of protecting an individual's right of publicity:
The loss may well exceed the mere denial of compensation for the use of the
individual's identity. The unauthorized use disrupts the individual's effort to
control his public image, and may substantially alter that image. The individual
may be precluded from future promotions in that as well as other fields. Further,
while ajudicious involvement in commercial promotions may have been perceived
as an important ingredient in one's career, uncontrolled exposure may be
dysfunctional. As a result, the development of his initial vocation - his profession
- may be arrested.
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438 (Bird, CJ., dissenting).
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For an individual of "celebrity" status, the public's unrestricted use of
his or her persona would probably result in that celebrity becoming
"overexposed." Therefore, the overexposed celebrity's "selling price" is
likely to be greatly reduced,3" and his or her chances for obtaining high
quality jobs are significantly impeded.
Even an individual who is not considered a "celebrity" should be
afforded protection from overexposure by some third party. For example,
consider an ordinary man walking by a burning building. He goes into the
burning building and saves the lives of some people. If the public is
allowed unrestricted use of the man's persona, the selling price for his story
may be greatly reduced because of his overexposure. Even this "non-
celebrity" should be able to control his public image since his exposure by
some third party may substantially alter the value of his image.
B. Preventing the Unjust Enrichment of Those
Who Usurp the Identity of Another
The economic rationale for the recognition of a right of publicity is
to assure that the one who desires to use the identity of another purchases
a license for its use.3' The rationale in favor of protecting a person's
publicity right was best articulated by the United States Supreme Court:
"[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect
of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay.
'32
Even if the individual whose persona has been infringed has suffered
no identifiable loss, the infringer has still been unjustly enriched and should
not be permitted to retain any profit that he has unjustly received.3 By
allowing right of publicity claims to prevail and therefore making the
infringer disgorge his profits, others will be deterred from attempting to use
an individual's person without permission and compensation.'
30. Hetherington, supra note 10, at 17.
31. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 411 (1978).
32. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 526,576 (1977) (quoting Harry
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law. Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 11.8[D], at 11-48.1 to 11-50.
34. Id.
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
C. Providing an Incentive to Creativity by Encouraging the
Production of Entertaining and Intellectual Works
As the Zacchini court noted, the same consideration underlying the
United States patent and copyright laws35 should provide economic
incentives to individuals to create performances of interest to the public.
3 6
The goal of patent laws is to bring new and improved products to the
public,37 thereby enhancing the wealth of society, by giving inventors an
incentive to create new products. Similarly, the goal the courts should seek
to promote in analyzing right of publicity cases is to bring new and more
entertaining personas' to the public by giving individuals an incentive to
create these personas.39
Though the Constitution does explicitly provide protection of
inventions under the patent laws,' it does not explicitly provide protection
for an individual's right of publicity. This constitutional silence regarding
the right of publicity may be due to the fact that, at the time the Consti-
tution was written, there was not nearly the value associated with being
prominent that there is today.4'
35. United States Patent and Copyright laws spring from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8:
"Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
36. The United States Supreme Court noted that:
[The] decision to protect [plaintiffs] right of publicity here rests on more than a
desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the
protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required
to produce a performance of interest to the public.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
37. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
38. "Because of a celebrity's audience appeal, people respond almost automatically to a
celebrity's name or picture." Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App.
1983).
39. See Hetherington, supra note 10, at 16 ('Were it not for the promise of the substantial
rewards that come with celebrity status, many individuals would be reluctant to fight the long
odds against achieving commercial success.").
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. Even in 1960, one scholar commented that "[tihe innovators... could not have foreseen
the advent of radio, television and motion pictures, and the concomitant scope and variety of
commercial exploitations of names, likenesses and personalities of individuals." Harold R.
Gordon, Right of Publicity in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553,
554-55 (1960).
1995]
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However, what about the "non-celebrity" who inadvertently achieves
some level of prominence or notoriety? Consider the following situations:
a scientist discovers a cure for some disease; a passerby heroically saves
people from a burning building; or an ordinary person experiences an event
that is of interest to the public. In these situations, economic incentive is
not germane to the "non-celebrity's" right of publicity claim. Nevertheless,
these "non-celebrities" do not lose their right because they are not
motivated by economic gain; the courts need to look to other rationale for
providing protection to the "non-celebrity."'42
III. FIRST AMENDMENT NEWSWORTHINESS DEFENSE
The First Amendment's policy of advancing the free flow of ideas,
integral to robust public debate, is the stumbling block for most right of
publicity claims.4" There is an inherent conflict between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity when an individual "commercially
benefits from a constitutionally protected use of another's identity."'
Often, this commercial benefit is the result of the unauthorized use of an
individual's persona in advertising or merchandising. In such purely
commercial settings, the courts will usually find that the individual's right
of publicity claim outweighs the infringer's First Amendment rights.45
Therefore, clear-cut infringement is not the focus of this article. The more
problematic situation is where an artist/infringer uses, without permission,
an individual's persona in a fiction-based work of art and profits from such
use.
42. For a discussion of the other rationales, see discussion supra, parts I.A and lI.B.
43. "The California Supreme Court has subjected the 'right of publicity' under California law
to a narrowing interpretation which accords with First Amendment values. The Court has
acknowledged that 'the right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the value of free expres-
sion."' Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454,461-62 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, CJ., concurring)), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1120 (1983); see also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 8, at 1577 n.2.
44. James Barr Haines, First Amendment 11: Developments in the Right of Publicity, 1989
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 211 (1990).
45. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (right of publicity
successfully invoked to prevent an automobile company from using Bette Midler's distinctive
style in its advertisements); Haelaen Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.) (right of publicity successfully invoked to protect professional baseball player's name and
picture on chewing gum cards), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See also Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 8, at 1606 (arguing that, because commercial settings such as advertising and
merchandising have almost no informative value and generally seek solely to exploit the
individual for economic gain, such use normally falls outside any First Amendment protection).
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In determining whether to allow the First Amendment privilege to
prevail over a right of publicity claim, the courts will attempt to balance
the artist's First Amendment rights against an individual's right to control
the commercial use of his or her persona. This balancing of First
Amendment rights entails evaluating whether the particular matter is of
public interest, or sufficiently "newsworthy,"' to warrant exclusion from
liability for the right of publicity claim. 7 When performing this balanc-
ing, most courts have found that the First Amendment newsworthiness
defense outweighs a right of publicity claim 8 However, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment privilege is not
an absolute defense when an individual's right of publicity has been in-
fringed.49
The media's use of an individual's persona in the presentation of
"news" is clearly constitutionally "immune from liability for infringement
of the right of publicity." 50 Courts have held that an individual's right of
publicity must yield to the First Amendment when the right conflicts "with
the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events and matters
of public interest."'5 It is this author's position that this statement is not
applicable in all right of publicity cases. In situations involving fiction-
based art, there may be a greater need to protect the individual whose
persona has been usurped rather than the infringer.52
46. The First Amendment privilege is coextensive with the meaning of newsworthiness.
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.8[B][2], at 8-45.
48. Haines, supra note 44, at 226 ("When confronted by such a conflict [First Amendment
v. right of publicity], courts almost invariably subordinate the interests protected by the right of
publicity to competing free speech interests."). A reason for this consistent trumping of right of
publicity claims can be found in a statement made by the California Court of Appeal: "Publication
of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know, and the freedom
... to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actionable." Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,
349 (Ct. App. 1983).
49. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The holding in this
case may only apply when the plaintiff's entire act is used. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
50. McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.8[A], at 8-43.
51. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1968).
52. The Ninth Circuit, in dictum, stated: 'The purpose of the media's use of a person's
identity is central. If the purpose is 'informative or cultural' the use is immune; 'if it serves no
such function but merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted."'
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting in part Felcher & Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ. 1577, 1596
(1979)).
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Though a number of courts generally found the concept of news-
worthiness expansive, 3 they have not agreed upon a definition of an
acceptable test of newsworthiness in the right of publicity arena.' The
United States Supreme Court, 55 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,56 and
California state courts57 either have not had the opportunity to define
"newsworthiness" in right of publicity cases or have been presented with
the opportunity but have failed to provide a workable test.
A. The United States Supreme Court's
Approach to Newsworthiness
The United States Supreme Court first attempted to give guidance on
what was a matter of "public interest" and hence deserving of First
Amendment protection in 7ime, Inc. v. Hill.58 Although this case is not
concerned with the right of publicity, it does provide a definition of what
is "newsworthy."5 9  Unfortunately, the Hill definition is circular.'
Defining what constitutes a "matter of public interest"' by examination
of what one would generally find in "any newspaper or magazine,"'62 the
Court allows the media itself to determine what constitutes a matter of
public concern.6 3 Unfortunately, this circular definition of "newsworthi-
ness," and minimization of plaintiff's interests have become common in
other courts as well.
53. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.8[B][2], at 8-46, 8-47 (citing Welch v. Group W Prods.,
Inc., 525 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 (1987)).
54. Haines, supra note 44, at 227 (arguing that numerous exceptions to the concept of
newsworthiness have caused confusion in the analysis of newsworthiness and inconsistent
decisions). But see, Joel S. Lind, The Right of Publicity in New York. A Practical Analysis, 7
ART & TH LAw 355, 371 (1983) (concluding that the state of New York law concerning the
right of publicity as of 1983 was not illogical or inconsistent, and was no more confusing than
any other new and developing body of law).
55. See discussion infra, part III.A.
56. See discussion infra, part III.B.
57. See discussion infra, part mII.C.
58. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
59. The Time case was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1967, ten years
before the Zacchini right of publicity case was decided. The Zacchini case is the one and only
right of publicity case that has been brought before the United States Supreme Court. See infra
notes 64-69 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has only attempted to
define what is "newsworthy" or of "public interest" in the Time case.
60. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.8[BJ[2], at 8-46.
61. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
62. Id.
63. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.8[B][2], at 8-46.
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In the only United States Supreme Court case to deal with the right
of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,61 the Court
used a multi-factored analysis in determining that the plaintiff's right of
publicity in his performance should be protected.65  This approach
eschewed the concept of premising liability on the mere absence of
"newsworthiness." The factors considered by the Court were: (1) the
threat the broadcast posed to the economic value of Zacchini's perform-
ance;66 (2) the policy of preventing unjust enrichment to the broadcasting
company by the taking of the goodwill Zacchini had created;67 and (3) the
necessity of providing incentives for performers to make the kind of
investments required in order to produce performances of interest to the
public. 68  Additionally, the Court noted that the public's interest in
obtaining the information shown on television concerning the performance,
the defendant's interest in presenting the performance, and the plaintiff's
interest in profiting from the performance could all be accommodated
because Zacchini did not seek to enjoin the broadcast, but to be re-
compensed for the value of the broadcast.69
In this well-reasoned approach, the Court accommodated the interests
of all parties, provided incentives to individuals to create works of interest
to the public, and avoided basing a determination of liability on a nebulous
concept of "newsworthiness."7  Unfortunately, other courts have not
been as successful at performing this balancing, and instead have looked to
"newsworthiness" as the touchstone of their analysis.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Newsworthiness
In the right of publicity decisions before the Ninth Circuit, the court
has rarely been confronted with the necessity to discuss or define matters
of "newsworthiness." The only discussion of newsworthiness by the Ninth
Circuit has been in the case of Virgil v. Time, Inc.,71 which involved the
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts."2 The court in Virgil
64. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
65. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
66. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76; see discussion supra, part I1.A.
67. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; see discussion supra, part ll.B.
68. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77; see discussion supra, part II.C.
69. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
70. The Zacchini case may be limited to its facts and therefore may only apply to situations
where the plaintiffs entire act is infringed. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
71. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
72. Id.
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adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard for newsworthiness.7 3
Therefore, since the Ninth Circuit has not been confronted with a right of
publicity case which warranted a discussion of newsworthiness, it has not
contributed to the development of a workable definition or test for
newsworthiness in the right of publicity arena.
C. California's Approach to Newsworthiness
Although the California Supreme Court, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc.,' developed a well-accepted test for newsworthiness in the law
of privacy, it has not been as successful in developing a workable test for
newsworthiness in right of publicity cases. In Briscoe, the court reiterated
the criteria for determining whether a work is newsworthy in a right of
privacy context: "(1) the social value of the facts published, (2) the depth
of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and (3) the extent
to which the party voluntarily acceded to position of public notoriety."75
In Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.,76 the California Court of Appeal had the
opportunity to adopt the Briscoe test for newsworthiness in right of
publicity cases, but properly declined to do so.' Neither Dora nor other
California cases have delved into the differing policies in the law of
privacy and right of publicity cases specifically with regards to newsworthi-
ness.
However, it seems clear that at least the second criteria of the Briscoe
test7' is an inappropriate consideration in right of publicity cases. This
privacy tort was developed to protect individuals from the embarrassing
disclosure of private facts.79 Therefore, under the law of privacy rubric,
it is reasonable to consider the depth of intrusion into private affairs.
By contrast, the right of publicity tort was developed to protect an
individual's property interest in his or her name or likeness and to
73. Id. at 1129-30 ('In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account
must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what
is proper becomes a matter of the community mores."). Id at 1129.
74. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
75. I. at 43 (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969)).
76. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (1993).
77. Id. at 793. Though the Dora court did not analyze the policy justifications for and
against the adoption of the Briscoe test (or Maheu test as the court referred to it) in right of
publicity cases, in dicta, it did apply the Briscoe test and found that even if the Briscoe test were
applied in Dora the result would not provide grounds for reversal, Id.
78. "['D]epth of ... intrusion into ostensibly private affairs." Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43.
79. See McCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8.7[C], at 8-40.
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encourage development of well known persona.80 The "depth of ...
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs" st is not a concern in a right of
publicity context. How far the infringer goes into an individual's private
affairs to capture his or her persona is irrelevant; it is the fact that the
persona is being commercially exploited by someone other than the owner
of that persona. The right of publicity is not concerned with the harm or
injury to the infringed party's feelings, as would be accommodated by the
second prong in the Briscoe test, but rather is concerned with the harm to
the infringed party's economic interest."2
While Dora did not adopt the Briscoe test83 for newsworthiness, it
did mention the mantras, "public interest" and "social value,"" heard time
and again in other right of publicity cases when evaluating newsworthiness.
Giving enormous weight to First Amendment concerns while downplaying
any property interest Dora had, the court stated: "Publication of matters in
the public interest which rests on the right of the public to know and the
freedom of the press to tell it, is not ordinarily actionable."8" The court
found that the subject of the documentary involved in Dora8 6 was of
"public interest," and it had "social value."'  Therefore defendant's use
of Dora's image was protected under the First Amendment.88
Just as Dora provides little insight into the meaning of newsworthi-
ness in the right of publicity context, Eastwood v. Superior Court"9
avoided having to balance the newsworthiness of an allegedly false article
against the plaintiff's interest. The Eastwood court did recognize that in
right of publicity cases, the outcome would turn on a balancing of the
plaintiff's private interest in his right of publicity against "matters of public
80. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) ("[Tihe
State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.").
81. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43.
82. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-92.
83. See text supra accompanying note 77.
84. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792-94.
85. Id. at 792 (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App. 1983)).
86. The documentary is of the legendary Malibu surf culture. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
Mickey Dora was a "sleek and powerful man who ruled Malibu through the 1960s [and] surfed
for the 'Gidget' movies." David Wharton, Hot And Bothered: The Pop-Idol Publicity Wave May
Be The Toughest That Surfing King Kelly Slater Has Ever Ridden, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993,
at El. He was a "legendary figure in surfing" whose "exploits at Malibu... are the folklore of
the sport." Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
87. Dora, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
88. Id. at 793-94. In addition to his common law claim, Dora also brought a statutory claim
for appropriation of name or likeness, which was also unsuccessful. Id. at 790, 795.
89. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
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interest calling for constitutional protection."" However, because
Eastwood did not allege the proper degree of scienter,91 the court deter-
mined that his cause of action was insufficient, and avoided having to reach
the balancing test.'
From the California cases involving right of publicity, we learn little
more than the fact that something newsworthy is a "matter of public
interest."93 Further, although that interest must be weighed against the
plaintiff's economic interest,94 we do not learn how much weight to give
the competing interests.
IV. FACT-BASED ART DESERVES MORE PROTECTION THAN
FICTION-BASED ART WHEN BALANCED AGAINST
AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The California courts, depending on whether the art is fact-based or
fiction-based, currently make inquiry into whether the matter is "of public
interest" or sufficiently "newsworthy" to immunize it from liability when
confronted with right of publicity claims.95 The amount of protection
accorded to factual works should not be as great as that given to works of
art which are based on fiction because "[t]he law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.
'9 6
If one were to apply California's standard of "newsworthiness" when
balancing a First Amendment protection of art against an individual's right
of publicity, it is the position of this author that the protection of art would
90. L. at 349.
91. Eastwood only alleged "calculated falsehood" and the court found that "knowledge or
reckless disregard of falsity" was required. Il at 352.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
94. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
95. See discussion supra, part II.B.
96. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985). But see,
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301
(1965), where the court, although discussing the protection of books versus motion pictures, is
implying that these entertaining works are deserving of the same level of protection as factual
works:
Motion pictures, as well as books, are "a significant medium for the communication
of ideas;" their importance "as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the
fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform;" and like books, they
are a constitutionally protected form of expression notwithstanding that "their




almost always prevail. The test used by the courts when determining
whether a particular matter is "newsworthy" is whether the matter is of
"public interest!'" or has "social value."'98 But, to some individuals,
almost every piece of art has some social value, though that value might
be exceedingly small.
This section of the article addresses why all works of art should not
be treated the same. Fiction-based works of art need to be evaluated
differently than fact-based works of art in light of an individual's right of
publicity. By providing less First Amendment protection to art based on
fiction for those who infringe upon an individual's persona, we should see
a trend develop whereby successful right of publicity claims become the
majority. Establishing this lower level of protection for the infringer also
better supports the infringed's right to control his or her commercial value
to which he or she is entitled, and for which the right of publicity was
designed to protect.
Section IVA discusses the value of fiction-based works of art and
fact-based works of art with respect to a First Amendment versus Right of
Publicity analysis. Section IVB confronts the problem of applying the
current "newsworthiness" analysis to art based on fiction. Section IVC
provides five factors that need to be considered by the courts when
confronted with a right of publicity-fiction-based art case.
A. The Value of Fiction-Based Art
Works and Fact-Based Art Works
The value to society of fiction-based art and fact-based art is generally
not the same. Therefore, fiction-based art and fact-based art should not be
afforded the same weight in the right of publicity context. Factual works
of art such as an historical montage with a photograph of an individual at
a protest rally may deserve the greatest amount of First Amendment
protection because it has socio-political importance. On the other hand, a
fiction-based work of art such as a painting of an individual in some
compromising situation conveys "little in the way of provocation of
thought, ... [has] scant relationship to the marketplace of ideas and
minimal bearing on the conduct of the polity." Thus, in this example,
the fiction-based art is merely exploitive in nature and deserves little, if
97. See supra notes 87 and 61-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. Marshall S. Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of
Public Communication, 46 TEX. L. REV. 650, 659 (1968).
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any, First Amendment protection against the individual's right of publicity.
Since the public's interest in dissemination of these works of art does not
weigh more heavily than the right of publicity of the individual upon whom
the work is based, the individual should be given more protection in the
uses to which his persona is put than the artist who uses that persona, or
the public that seeks the unauthorized exploitation of the persona.
Professor Nimmer made a similar point in the copyright context.
Professor Nimmer noted that oftentimes graphic works cannot be adequate-
ly described in words or other non-infringing forms of expression.1°°
However, just because these graphic works may in some way contribute to
the discussion of ideas in society does not mean that courts should allow
others to violate the creator's copyright in the work.'0 ' Because these
graphic works do not, relatively speaking, contribute greatly to political
discourse, the interest most highly protected by the First Amendment, the
copyright holder's interest in these works is greater than the public's
interest in the unauthorized dissemination of these works.1°2
Nimmer aptly contrasted graphic art works with what may be
considered an almost purely factual work - news photographs.0 3
Noting that photographs of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam gave the
public a unique understanding of that event, those "expressions" of the
"idea" of the My Lai massacre became essential to the public's understand-
ing of the event."°4  Because the news photographs were essentially
factual works, the copyright holder's interest in the photographs did not
outweigh the public's interest in the dissemination of those photo-
graphs.
05
Nimmer also commented to the same effect regarding Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates.1°6 In Time, Time Magazine bought a home
movie capturing the assassination of John F. Kennedy and held the
copyright on the movie.0 7 Subsequently, an author included sketches
depicting frames of the movie in a book about the Kennedy assassi-
nation.0" Though the case was not decided on First Amendment princi-
ples, Ninmner commented that First Amendment free speech interests





105. NIMMER & NIMBER, supra note 100, at § 1.10[C][2]d.
106. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
107. Id. at 131.
108. ld. at 132.
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outweighed the copyright holder's interest in control of dissemination of the
work.' 9
B. California's Newsworthiness Analysis Is Not Adequate
When Confronted With Fiction-Based Art
The application of the California standard of newsworthiness"'
gives great weight to the infringer because it assumes that the work of art
is of great interest and benefit to the public. But fictional works of art are
not always of as much value as factual works. Perhaps the protection
afforded all works of art, whether fact-based or fiction-based, is due, in
part, to the fact that the courts do not want to determine whether a
particular work of art has "socio-political" value and is informative, or is
merely exploiting an individual for economic gain.
Although art is very important to our culture, its importance to the
public should not always outweigh an individual's right to control the
commercial use of his own persona. Because the courts currently do not
seem to make the distinction between fiction-based art and fact-based art,
an individual's common law right of publicity fails much more frequently
than it should. The courts need to look beyond the question of whether the
particular matter is of "public interest" when confronted with a matter of
fiction-based art."'
C. Factors Other Than "Newsworthiness"
Need to Be Considered
While the author's position is clear that fiction-based art generally
deserves less First Amendment protection than works based on fact,"' the
question arises, under what circumstances does the interest of the individual
outweigh the interests in dissemination of the art work. Commentators
have often discussed an analogous conflict - the inherent conflict between
First Amendment rights on one hand, and the rights of those who publish
in controlling dissemination of their works on the other."
3
109. NIMMER & NMMER, supra note 100.
110. See discussion supra, part HI.C.
111. "Public interest attaches to people who by their accomplishments or mode of living
create a bona fide attention to their activities." Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d
790, 792 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405,414 (Ct.
App. 1962)).
112. See discussion supra, part IV.A.
113. NInMER & NiMmER, supra note 100, at § 1.10[A] ("T]he views of copyright and the
First Amendment, held 'side by side,' may, in fact, be contradictory."); WJLLtAM F. PATRY, THE
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Not surprisingly, copyright law presents an analogous analytical
framework with which to examine this issue. This framework is the fair
use doctrine."4 Under the fair use doctrine, four factors are considered
when determining whether an infringer's use of a copyrighted work is
"fair."11  These factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work."6
While similarities between the right of publicity and copyright exist,
the analogy is not perfect. It breaks down when considering the nature of
a copyrighted work and the nature of the right of publicity. To be
copyrightable, a work must be "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion.""' 7 Therefore, copyright infringement generally occurs when a party
uses or sells a work or part of a work already created or published. For
example, taking extensive verbatim exerpts from a manuscript authored by
Gerald Ford and using those exerpts in another publication was copyright
infringement.1 In right of publicity cases, however, the infringer creates
or publishes a completely new work," 9 though based on another's
persona.
FAIR USE PRIVI.EE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (1985) (pointing out that some have viewed
copyright as a "stepchild of censorship" continually in tension with the First Amendment).
114. Fair use is codified in the Copyright Act, 35 U.S.C. § 107.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 107.
116. Id.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The tangible fixation requirement does not apply to the right of
publicity as it does in copyright. Consider a copyrighted book. The book is comprised of
numerous pages with words written on them, tangibly fixed. The words and pages are not
evanescent, whereas unrecorded spoken words are evanescent. By contrast, a celebrity persona
often changes dramatically over time and can be considered as evanescent as spoken words. For
a timely and striking example of the change in a celebrity persona, consider popular music star
Michael Jackson. Prior to the 1993 allegations of Jackson's child molestation he was a highly
marketable music superstar. Since the molestation allegations, long-time sponsors such as Pepsi
Cola have dropped Jackson as a celebrity endorser and his public image has been tainted, at least
for the moment. See Pepsi Drops Michael Jackson, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at Dl.
118. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
119. For example, a painting or story that makes use of a celebrity persona.
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.For example, consider Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 20  In AU, Playgirl
magazine, the alleged right of publicity infringer, -published a painting of
a nude boxer bearing a striking resemblance to Muhammad All.
2'
Though the painting was a new work, never before published, it was based
on Ali's image. To a lesser -extent, the same was true in Zacchini where
Zacchini's performance, at least for the day in question, had never been
published.'2
Unlike a copyrightable work, a persona is not fixed in a tangible
medium.' 3  This difference between right of publicity and copyright
gives rise to the need to use a: somewhat different analysis than fair use
and, additionally, consider two factors not statutorily required under the fair
use analysis. The most analogous fair use factors applicable to the right of
publicity are: (a) purpose and character of the use; and (b) amount and
substantiality of the portion used. 24 Additionally, a policy consideration
for both copyright and the right of the publicity is the effect on the
incentive for the creator to create valuable works. The applicable factors
not considered in fair use are the economic interests of the infringer and the
marketability of the infringed's persona. Therefore, the following factors
should be considered when balancing an infringed's right of publicity
against an infringer's right to use the infringed's persona in his or her
fictional work of art: (1) the nature of the work;" s (2) the extent of the
use of the infringed;" 6 (3) the effect on the infringed's incentive to create
a valuable persona;12 7 (4) the marketability of the infringed's per-
sona; 2' and (5) the economic interests of the infringer. 9
1. Nature of the Work
Under the fair use doctrine, if the "purpose and character" of the use
of a copyrighted work, or the "nature" of the use of a work is educational
120. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
121. Id. at 726-27.
122. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
123. Similarly, just as a persona is not copyrightable because it is not fixed, a "voice" is not
copyrightable because sounds are not fixed. Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460. 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (Bette Midler's voice found not copyrightable because sounds are not fixed).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 107.
125. See discussion infra, part WV.C.l.
126. See discussion infra. part IV.C.2.
127. See discussion infra, part 1V.C.3.
128. See discussion infra, part IV.CA.
129. See discussion infra, part IV.C.5.
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rather than commercial, it is more likely to be found a "fair" use.
1 30
Since an art work based on fact is more likely than a work based on
fantasy131 to depict useful information about an actual event, there is a
greater likelihood that the fact based work will educate more than will the
fantasy based work. Therefore, application of a fair use type of standard
in the right of publicity arena would provide greater protection to fact
based works that appropriate a persona than to fantasy based works.
The only case found that adopted the fair use standards in the right of
publicity context and considered the "nature of the work" is Apple Corps
Ltd. v. Leber.132  Though the court in Apple explicitly adopted the fair-
use standards, it did not explicitly provide any details as to how the fair-use
factors apply in the right of publicity context.'33 The court did, however,
touch upon two of the factors when analogizing to Zacchini. These factors
were: (a) purpose and character of the use; and (b) amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used. 4
In Apple, the plaintiffs brought a claim based on the right of publicity
against the producers of Beatlemania, a live performance of Beatles songs
by musicians who looked and sounded like the Beatles. 3 Analogizing
to Zacchini, the Apple court found that the primary purpose of Beatlemania
was to commercially exploit the goodwill and popularity of the Beatles'
persona.1 36 This factor is clearly analogous to the "purpose and character
of the use" factor under the fair use analysis.
Other fair use cases, not involving the right of publicity, have also
focused on the commercial nature of the defendant's use to determine
130. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1984)
("Although not conclusive, the first factor requires that 'the commercial or nonprofit character of
an activity' be weighed in any fair use decision.").
131. A work of fantasy is intended to be synonymous with the author's terminology of
fiction-based art.
132. 12 Media L. Rep. 2280 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1986).
133. Id. at 2282. The court summarily found that "defendants' appropriation greatly
exceeded any fair use. Without going into unnecessary detail (actually any detail at all] in this
memorandum, it appears by all tests, the scale tips in favor of plaintiff." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2281.
136. Id at 2282.
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whether the use was fair. 37 In these cases the most significant factor is
the usefulness of the information provided to the public.
In the fiction-based art context, defendants might always claim that
their art works impart some useful information to the public. However, just
as the defendants in Apple claimed that Beatlemania "contained significant
political and social comment,"' 38 merely claiming that the work imparts
useful information is not enough. The reason why fiction-based art should
survive a right of publicity attack less frequently than fact-based works,
such as news photographs, 39 is that art based on fiction is much less
likely to impart useful information. The art work is typically based on the
artist's imagination. When the art work is not a true to life depiction of an
actual event that is important for the public to understand, the art work
should be given a lesser level of protection."
2. Extent of the Use of the Infringed
A second fair use factor applicable to right of publicity cases is the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used,'' 4. or, in right of publicity
terms, the extent of the use of the individual's persona. Just as the court
in Apple demonstrated the applicability of the fair use factor "purpose and
character of the work" to a right of publicity case, so did it apply the extent
of the use factor.'42
137. In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984), the court allowed a use of excerpts of a review of a
product written for Consumer Reports magazine in an advertisement for the product. The court
made a very instructive point when analyzing the "character" of the use, i.e., whether the use is
commercial or not. Though "[a]lmost all newspapers, books and magazines are published by
commercial enterprises that seek a profit," presence or absence of a profit seeking motive is not
dispositive. Id. at 1049. Rather the key is whether the use conveys "useful information" to the
public. Id.
Similarly, in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), the court allowed private home video taping of free broadcasts because the taping
provided "the fullest possible access to information through the public airwaves." ld. at 454
(citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
138. Apple, 12 Media L. Rep. at 2281.
139. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
140. By way of contrast, in Time, the art work, sketches of film frames showing the
assassination of John F. Kennedy, was found to be a true to life depiction of an actual event in
which the public had a very strong interest in receiving the fullest possible information. See
discussion supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 107.
142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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In Apple, the court found that the defendants' use of the Beatles'
persona amounted to a complete misappropriation. 4 3 Though the court
did not couch this analysis in terms of fair use, this factor is clearly
analogous to the "amount and substantiality of the portion used" fair use
factor. Under the fair use analysis, an infringing work that is based
completely on a copyrighted work is generally considered not to be a fair
use.1' In Beatlemania, the performance was based almost entirely on the
songs and appearance of the Beatles. 45 The court found that viewers of
the Beatlemania performance might "suspend their disbelief and [fall] prey
to the illusion that they were actually viewing the Beatles in perform-
ance."'4 Because the taking was so substantial, it was not a fair use.'4
Cases outside the right of publicity realm also find that a taking based
completely on another work will not be considered a fair use."48 How-
ever, the quantity of the taking is not the only measure to be used when
considering the extent of the taking. One must also look to the "value" of
the material appropriated.
49
A fiction-based art work that is centered completely around the
infringed's persona that does not make some mitigating "creative com-
ment"'50  should not be allowed.' Similarly, neither should an art
work that may only partly consist of the appropriation of a persona be
allowed if the marketability of the art work is based on the appropriation.
Because it is the "value" of the material taken that might allow the
infringer to profit, the use should not be allowed. 5
143. Apple, 12 Media L. Rep. at 2282.
144. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d. Cir), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987) ("[What is relevant is the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted expression that
has been used ... ").
145. Apple, 12 Media L. Rep. at 2281.
146. Id at 2282.
147. Id Similarly, in Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day And Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), the district court found
that a "wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters" substantially overshadowed the
intent to criticize or parody, and was not permissible. Id. at 493.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. PATRY, supra note 113, at 452.
150. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1358 n.18 (D. N.J. 1981).
151. For example, consider the painting of Muhammad Ali in AlL. If the entire painting
consists solely of All, the infringer should not be allowed to profit from that painting.
152. Continuing with the Ali example, consider a painting that has many elements in it,
maybe lions, tigers, elephants, monkeys, and Ali in a comer sitting on a throne implying that Ali
is king of the jungle of boxers. If the entire appeal of the work came from the use of Ali's
image, the infringer should not be allowed to profit from the work. Even though the depiction
of Ali is only a small portion of the work, Ali's image gives the work its value.
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3. Effect on the Infringed's Incentive
to Create a Valuable Persona
The dramatic rise in value associated with fame did not occur until the
first half of the twentieth century when the "star system" first devel-
oped. 53 Today, the profits that can be made capitalizing on famous
personas are tremendous."s Without incentives to create these personas
that the public seems so desirous of, as manifested by the amount the
public is willing to spend, it is quite possible that the entertaining and
intellectual works created by the individuals who stand to profit would be
greatly diminished. While the Federal Constitution may not provide
explicit protection for these personas, the courts should provide strong
common law protection for them.
Analogizing to the rationale behind the protection provided by patent
and copyright law, an individual should have a greater right to control the
use of his persona in a work of fiction than a work of fact. In patent and
copyright law, pure ideas are not protected.' Only the applications of
ideas are protected.
5 6
A work of fact which mentions a persona is analogous to a pure idea.
A pure idea describes some real life event or basic truth of nature.
5 7
153. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 128 (1993). Similarly, as discussed supra in Part II.C, the
"incentive" factor is not necessarily germane to a right of publicity cause of action for a "non-
celebrity." Depending upon the particular circumstances surrounding the individual whose
persona was infringed, this factor may not be at issue.
154. For example, annual revenues from "music merchandising" alone are estimated to be
over half a billion dollars. Id. at 129, n.10.
155. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("[P]henomena of nature,. . . mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work."); JoHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTION-
AL LAW § 16.36, at 1055 (4th ed. 1991) ("Copyright law ... protects only the form of the
expression, not the facts or ideas expressed." (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918))). See also PETER D. ROSENBERO, PATENT LAW FUNDAMEN-
TALS § 1.03, at 1-14 (2d ed. 1994) ("A fundamental principle common to all genres of intellectual
property is that they do not carry any exclusive right in mere abstract ideas. Rather, their
exclusivity touches only the concrete, tangible, or physical embodiment of an abstraction.").
156. RoSENBERG, supra note 155, §1.04. at 1-20 to 1-21 ("[O]nly inventions are patentable
- naked discoveries are not!" (citing In re Kemper, 14 Fed. Cas. 286 (No. 7,687) (C.C.D.C.
1841))).
157. See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939); Victor de Gyarfas, Software as Patentable Subject Matter: A Comparison of International
Approaches, 18 NEw MATrER No. 3, at 7, 8 (An example of a pure idea is Einstein's famous
equation describing the mathematical relationship between mass and energy, E=mc.).
1995]
406 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
Similarly, a factual report that includes mention of a persona describes a
real life event. Therefore, an individual's right to control the mention of
his persona in a factual work should be severely limited, just as the ability
to monopolize an idea is severely limited. The value to the public is too
great to allow that kind of monopolization.
However, a work of fiction which includes a persona is analogous to
an application of an idea. An artist who takes a persona created by another
for use in his fictional work of art is like a copyright or patent infringer
who has taken the creation of another and used it without permission. Just
as a copyright or patent holder has powerful remedies against infringers, so
should the "persona holder" have powerful remedies against infringers in
the realm of art works. If the persona holder does not have these remedies,
his incentive to create may be severely diminished by fearless infringers.
4. Marketability of the Infringed's Persona
In the copyright context, the act of copying an already created or
published work often does not diminish the demand for future works by the
infringed. For example, if an infringer were to copy and sell a John
Grisham novel less expensively than the original publisher, it is unlikely
that the demand for future novels by John Grisham would be diminished
in any way. As evidenced by Grisham's success with several novels, the
public keeps hungering for new stories by Grisham. Therefore, under
copyright, the future marketability of the infringed work is not considered.
However, in the right of publicity context, the infringer's use of an
infringed's persona may be a significant factor leading to the dreaded
"overexposure" of that individual, causing a decline in the public's desire
for information about the individual. This decline in public interest has a
corresponding detrimental effect on the ability of the celebrity to sell his
persona or the ability to leverage himself into highly desirable positions,
such as high paying company jobs or lead roles in important films.
5. Economic Interests of the Infringer
Because the infringer is creating something that had not existed
before, presumably there is some contribution to society that should be
valued. However, in valuing this contribution, consideration should be
given to the motives, or economic interest of the infringer or creator. If the
infringer created something that contributed useful facts to society or
contributed to political discourse, then the infringer or creator's use of the
RIGHT OF PUBLCITY
persona may be allowed."' If instead the infringer or creator's motives
were premised primarily upon creating a personal economic gain, as the
author has argued is the case with many fiction-based art works, then the
infringer/creator's use should not be allowed.' 59
When evaluating whether a person in the realm of gathering and
disseminating facts has been unjustly enriched by use of an individual's
persona, courts consider the enrichment to the public versus the degree of
deprivation of the individual of his persona. Since the dissemination of
factual information is of great social importance, the scales tend to tip in
favor of the infringer, even though the infringer has been unjustly enriched.
There is no great social value in allowing an artist, whose primary
purpose is to make a living, to disseminate his art and capitalize on another
person's identity."6 Further, there exists a great likelihood that an artist
will exploit a prominent person's persona for purely financial benefit.
Therefore, the scales of protection should tip in favor of the individual
whose identity has been exploited for financial gain by another. This type
of policy is necessary to keep the incentive for individuals to produce
entertaining personas.
V. APPLICATION TO CASES
This section applies the multi-factored analysis of Part IV to right of
publicity cases involving the infringement of an individual's persona in a
fiction-based art context. This new approach would permit the courts to
avoid having to use the current First Amendment analysis for all right of
publicity cases, in consonance with courts' desires to avoid deciding a case
on constitutional grounds if independent grounds for the decision exist.6
The two cases used in this section are not California cases, since
California fails to provide the range of differing fact scenarios necessary to
adequately demonstrate application of the multi-factored analysis. The first
case involves the use of a famous mystery writer's name and identity in a
fictionalized book and motion picture that concerns the mystery writer. 62
This case is used to illustrate a scenario in which the analysis would favor
158. See discussion supra, part IV.A.
159. See discussion supra, part IV.A.
160. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
161. James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 805 (1993) (The United States Supreme Court
recognizes a doctrine whereby "a court should avoid addressing a constitutional issue if a case
can be decided on any other grounds.").
162. See discussion infra, part V.A.
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the plaintiff's right of publicity over the defendant's rights. The second
case involves the use of an Archbishop's name in a novel and demonstrates
a fact pattern in which the plaintiff's right of publicity does not tri-
umph.163
A. Application to Hicks v. Casablanca Records"
The outcome of Hicks v. Casablanca Records would have been
different had the court used the author's five factors in analyzing whether
Agatha Christie's right of publicity claim should succeed. Although there
is no common law descendibility for right of publicity claims in Cali-
fornia, 65 the Hicks case provides a very interesting set of facts for
application of the analysis.
In Hicks, Agatha Christie's name and identity were used undisputedly,
without consent, in the defendants' book and motion picture.66 The
book and movie are based on the eleven day disappearance of Mrs. Christie
in 1926.67 The whereabouts of Mrs. Christie were as much of a mystery
then as they are today. 68 The defendants provided a fictionalized
account of Mrs. Christie's disappearance. 69 The court ruled against the
right of publicity claim brought by the heir and assignees of Mrs. Christie,
finding that "the right of publicity does not attach here, where a fiction-
alized account of an event in the life of a public figure is depicted in a
novel or a movie, and .. . it is evident to the public that the events so
depicted are fictitious."'7 °
First, the nature of the defendants' work is clearly non-educa-
tional.'7 There is little likelihood that the book and movie actually
163. See discussion infra, part V.B.
164. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
165. The California Supreme Court stated:
There has... been a good deal of consistency in the rules that have been applied
to the four disparate torts under the common name. As to any of the four, it is
agreed that the plaintiff's right is a personal one, which does not extend to members
of his family, unless, as is obviously possible, their own privacy is invaded along
with his. The right is not assignable, and while the cause of action may or may not
survive after his death ... there is no common law right of action for a publication
concerning one who is already dead.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1979) (citing DEAN PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 814-15 (4th ed. 1971)).




170. Id. at 433.
171. See discussion supra, part IV.C.I.
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educated anybody about Mrs. Christie's life during her eleven day
disappearance. At best, "the public will have a fictionalized account of this
disappearance as set forth in the movie and in the book."'
72
Second, the extent of the use of Mrs. Christie's persona was quite
substantial. 173  Defendants appropriated both Mrs. Christie's name 74
and identity"75 and did not dispute the fact that Mrs. Christie and her
disappearance were the primary focus of both the book and movie.
76
Third, since Agatha Christie is deceased, there was no effect on her
incentive to create a valuable persona.' 77 However, for the purposes of
argument, the analysis will proceed as though Mrs. Christie were still alive.
Here, Mrs. Christie's persona was used in a work of fiction and, thus, was
like an application of an "idea" (her persona) that Mrs. Christie should have
the right to control. Taking away Mrs. Christie's ability to control the
application of her persona could lessen Mrs. Christie's incentive to further
develop her persona..
In the right of publicity context, public policy dictates that it is
important to promote the continued creation of entertaining and intellectual
works. 71 The individual's economic incentive to make money is not the
primary focus here. However, in order for society to advance the creation
of entertaining and intellectual works, there needs to be some financial
benefit to those who create the works. Therefore, if others were allowed
to take Mrs. Christie's persona without paying, she might well decide that
there would be little reason for her to keep developing her persona, thus
depriving the public of her works.
Fourth, it is without question that Mrs. Christie was a marketable
figure.179 Mrs. Christie developed her persona "in such a way as to make
it almost synonymous with mystery novels."'8 0 The use of her name in
motion pictures and plays based on her works'8 ' was highly marketable,
172. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429.
173. See discussion supra, part LV.C.2.
174. The movie and book are both entitled "Agatha," thus making use of Mrs. Christie's first
name. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429. The body of both the movie and the book make use of Mrs.
Christie's last name. Id. at 431.
175. The identity of Mrs. Christie as a mystery writer was also appropriated. Hicks, 464 F.
Supp. at 429.
176. Id.
177. See discussion supra, part IV.C.3.
178. See discussion supra, part II.C.
179. See discussion supra, part IV.CA.
180. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 428.
181. Id. at 430.
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and she herself had exploited that market during promotions of her own
works. 82
Finally, although the economic interests of the infringer 83 are not
always clear, it can be inferred from the facts of Hicks that the defendants
had a strong economic motive for using Mrs. Christie's name and identity.
It is undisputed that both the book and movie concerned Mrs. Christie,'
and that the public has a great interest in reading her books and enjoying
works about her. If the defendants had chosen a different character, e.g.
Samantha Sleuth, the public might not have been as interested in reading
the book or viewing the movie. Arguably, at least Agatha Christie fans
might not have been as interested. This evinces the defendants' desire to
capitalize off Mrs. Christie and her eleven day disappearance. Therefore,
it becomes clear that the defendants' motive in using Mrs. Christie's name
and identity was for the purpose of achieving higher sales of their novel
and movie tickets than would have been realized if Mrs. Christie's identity
were not used.
In conclusion, it is clear that applying these five factors to the facts
of Hicks would lead to a successful common law right of publicity cause
of action.
B. Application to Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing' 85
By way of contrast to Hicks, application of this multi-factored analysis
does not always create a favorable result for the plaintiff. In Marcinkus v.
NAL Publishing, for example, the plaintiff's interests would not have been
significant enough to prevail. In Marcinkus, a Vatican official, Archbishop
Marcinkus, sued for an injunction restraining defendant publishers from
using the plaintiff's name in connection with publication of a novel.' 86
In the novel, the character named Marcinkus plotted to kill then Soviet
Premier Yuri Andropov.'87 In real life, Marcinkus had attained some
notoriety when, as head of the Vatican Bank, he was implicated in the
collapse of Banco Ambrosiano.'
Though, on balance, the author's five factors weigh against Marcin-
kus, the first factor, the "nature of the work," weighs in Marcinkus' favor.
182. Id. at 429.
183. See discussion supra, part IV.C.5.
184. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429.
185. 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
186. Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing, 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
187. Id. at 1010.
188. Id. at 1009-10.
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The art work here was a novel that did not depict any true life event. In
fact, the novel had a disclaimer stating that the actions of the characters
named after real people were "entirely fictitious and should not be
considered real or factual."' 9 Thus there was no educational value about
a real life event in the work. 90
The second factor, however, "extent of the use of the celebrity,"' 9'
does weigh against the plaintiff. In Marcinkus, the defendant used
Marcinkus' name and position in the novel. However, Marcinkus' persona
was not central to the novel. In fact, in the United Kingdom release of the
book, Marcinkus' name was replaced with another name."9 In contrast
to Hicks, where Agatha Christie's persona was central to the work of art,
Marcinkus' persona was not. The novel was based largely on fictional
events - e.g., the conspiracy to assassinate a foreign leader - which were
completely unconnected with Marcinkus' persona.1 93 Thus, the extent of
the use of Marcinkus' persona was minor.
Perhaps the factor that weighs most strongly against the plaintiff in
Marcinkus is the third factor, "effect on the celebrity's incentive to create
a valuable persona."1 94 Marcinkus, an Archbishop, was presumably not
driven by the same motivating factors that drive typical entertainment
industry plaintiffs. As a man who dedicated his life to religious pursuits,
Marcinkus did not seek out fame and notoriety the way an actor or an
author would. That is, Marcinkus probably did not put a great deal of
energy into creating a well known persona for the primary purpose of
creating public recognition of that persona, as a famous actor would.
Correspondingly, the effect of the defendants' novel on Marcinkus'
incentive to create a persona valuable to the public was minimal.
Marcinkus himself was probably never driven to profit from his notoriety.
Therefore, Marcinkus probably would not have been less motivated to rise
through the religious ranks had he known that someone might profit from
his notoriety. This same type of analysis could well apply to a public
servant/public office holder who was primarily driven by the desire to serve
the public.
Further, the fourth factor, "marketability of the infringed,"195 also
weighs against Marcinkus. Here there was no evidence, and it seems
189. Id. at 1013.
190. See discussion supra, part 1V.C.I.
191. See discussion supra, part WV.C.2.
192. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
193. Id
194. See discussion supra, part 1V.C.3.
195. See discussion supra, part V.CA.
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unlikely, that Marcinkus had used his persona to market other works of art
or other goods. Nor did the court find that Marcinkus faced any risk of
"overexposure" or that his future attempts to market his persona would be
impaired by the novel.
Finally, even though the fifth factor, "economic interests of the
infringer," 96 weighs in the plaintiff's favor, the overall balance still
favors the defendant. In Marcinkus, the court framed the issue as "whether
the appropriation of plaintiff's name 'was primarily for trade or advertising
purposes ... .""9 Though the court did not seem to provide a clear
answer to this issue, the court did find that, from the record, it could not
be concluded that the defendants did not use the plaintiff's name for trade
or advertising.198 Therefore, because the defendants did use the plaintiff's
name for advertising, the defendants' interests in creating an economic gain
to themselves is clear.
On balance, Marcinkus' interests are not significant enough for him
to prevail in his right of publicity cause of action. There was no proof of
any effect on Marcinkus' incentive to further develop his persona; there
was relatively minor use of Marcinkus' persona; and there was a lack of
marketability of Marcinkus.
VI. CONCLUSION
California courts currently do not distinguish between art based on
fact and art based on fiction in the right of publicity context. The courts
currently undertake an analysis of "newsworthiness" under the First
Amendment to determine whether the use of an individual's persona should
be allowed in an art work. However, the value to society of fiction-based
art and the value to society of fact-based art is generally not the same.
Therefore, fiction-based art should be analyzed differently than fact-based
art in the right of publicity context.
Rather than applying First Amendment principles to art works based
on fiction, courts should employ a multi-factored analysis considering: (1)
the nature of the work; (2) the extent of the use of the infringed; (3) the
effect on the individual's incentive to create a valuable persona; (4) the
marketability of the infringed; and (5) the economic interests of the
infringer. By using this multi-factored analysis, the right of publicity will
provide broader protection to the individual whose persona has been
196. See discussion supra, part IV.C.5.
197. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1011 (citations omitted).
198. 1d at 1014.
1995] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 413
infringed. The purpose for the right of publicity as a separate cause of
action would be furthered by the use of this multi-factored analysis since
it better protects the economic value of an individual's identity, prevents
unjust enrichment to the infringer of an individual's identity, and provides
incentives to individuals to create entertaining or intellectual works.
414 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
